Performance Measurement and Incentive Plans

Kauhanen AnttiNapari Sami

This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.

Information om publikationen

Serie
Discussion Papers no. 1216
Datum
2010
Nyckelord
incentive pay, performance measurement, risk versus distortion trade-off, agency theory
JEL
J33,M52,M54
Sidor
28
Pris
10 €
Tillgänglighet av tryckt version
Tillgänglig
Språk
Engelska